(The Center Square) – Arguments in two separate appeals were heard by the Illinois Supreme Court Tuesday in Springfield. One appeal challenges the state’s law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, arguing it violates the Second Amendment. The other brings questions about double jeopardy in criminal proceedings within the State.
Challenges to FOID laws
The defense, arguing for James Benson, contends that the state’s unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon statute, as applied to Benson in this case, is unconstitutional.
The defense asserts that Benson is protected by the Second Amendment, despite a prior felony conviction for possessing a gun without a Firearm Owner’s Identification card.
When asked by justices if the case could be sent back down to the appellate court for fact finding, appearing as counsel for Benson, Elizabeth Cook from the office of the State Appellette Defender shared what the court might find.
“The past history that the court could determine is this unlawful use of a weapon by a felon conduct, which we know was an offense that was charged on the basis of his lack of a FOID card … it’s not characterized by any violent conduct,” Cook said.
The state of Illinois, represented by Assistant Attorney General Garson Fischer, argued the U.S. Supreme Court has regularly upheld laws banning felons from possessing firearms.
“The court reaffirmed the holding of those earlier cases, that the Second Amendment protects the rights of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms. So that category, law-abiding citizens, necessarily excludes all felons,” Fischer said.
Fischer also highlights that Illinois law provides a path for felons to regain their FOID card, suggesting the ban is not absolute.
In addition, Fischer pointed to the UPWF statute aligning with a historical tradition of disarming individuals deemed dangerous, citing historical punishments for felonies that were far more severe than disarmament, and legislative authority to define serious offenses.
Double jeopardy challenge
The court’s second hearing pits a defendant’s right against double jeopardy against the consequences of requesting separate trials for related charges.
Terry T. Collins was charged with three gun-possession offenses after a firearm was found in a car where he was a passenger. Collins faced charges of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, violating the FOID Card Act, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.
His defense successfully moved to sever the UPWF charge, which was tried first. Due to the severance, the jury was left to decide only whether he knowingly possessed the gun. The jury returned a not-guilty verdict.
Following the acquittal, the defense moved to dismiss the remaining unlawful use of a weapon and FOID card charges, citing that a component of double jeopardy barred further prosecution.
Zachary Wallace from the office of the State Appellate Defender, representing Collins, contended that the jury’s not-guilty verdict meant it had already determined he did not knowingly possess the gun, an ultimate fact essential to the other charges.
“What Mr. Collins asks in this case is that the state should not be allowed multiple opportunities to relitigate an issue that a jury already has rejected or resolved in Mr. Collins’ favor,” Wallace said. “The state argues that by severing, Mr. Collins has waived not only his double jeopardy protections, state argues he’s necessarily waved issue preclusion protections and he’s essentially waved any right to prevent the state from relitigating an issue.”
The state of Illinois, represented by Assistant Attorney General Josh Schnider, argued that the defense cannot use Collins’ acquittal in the first trial to bar the second trial because he requested the separate trials. He cited previous case law, Currier v. Virginia, which asserts that a defendant who consents to two trials cannot claim a double jeopardy violation.
Schnider said the purpose of double jeopardy is to protect against government oppression, not to relieve a defendant from the consequences of their voluntary choices.
