After months of bipartisan negotiations, Congress continues to debate crypto market structure legislation, though questions remain whether common sense investor protections will be included in a new federal framework for digital assets.
These proposals address fundamental questions aimed at providing needed clarity for digital asset markets, including around agency jurisdiction, and trust and confidence for mainstream adoption of modern markets. At times, the negotiations fractured over stablecoin yields, while provisions addressing decentralized finance and developer liability and the importance of investor safeguards have proven similarly divisive.
The GENIUS Act prohibits stablecoin issuers from paying interest, recognizing such payments transform digital tokens into bank deposits requiring regulatory oversight. Platforms opposing restrictions on stablecoin yields prioritize business models generating revenue by offering deposit-like products without deposit-like regulation – an unfair regulatory arbitrage that disadvantages prudentially supervised banks, drains funding from local lending and introduces systemic risk without corresponding accountability.
While these complex issues require careful calibration, there is no substitute for keeping investor-first reforms at the center of market structure legislation and prioritizing clear rules and robust investor safeguards that ensure digital assets benefit everyday investors and that America strengthens its economic competitiveness and leads the next era of financial innovation.
Such impasses reflect a pattern where narrow interests prevail over broader economic considerations. Platforms opposing restrictions on stablecoin yields prioritize business models generating revenue by offering deposit-like products without deposit-like regulation. Banking institutions recognize that unregulated competition operating under lower-cost structures will drain funding from local lending. Both positions are economically rational for the parties involved. Neither serves the public interest in financial stability.
Likewise, opponents argue that regulation stifles innovation, especially in decentralized finance. But this conflates innovation with regulatory arbitrage. Genuine technological progress creates value by improving efficiency or reducing costs. Regulatory arbitrage extracts value by exploiting gaps between economically equivalent activities subject to different rules.
The alternative claim – that existing securities laws suffice – ignores that those frameworks were designed for different market structures. Securities laws assume centralized issuers. Commodity regulations assume physical delivery. Digital assets often fit neither category cleanly, creating uncertainty that inhibits legitimate activity while failing to prevent abuse.
The choice is not between perfect legislation and the status quo but between establishing clear rules now or waiting for the next crisis. Financial regulation written in crisis tends toward overcorrection that stifles markets for years. Regulation developed deliberately better balances stability with innovation. Both House and Senate committee versions share core elements providing needed clarity on agency jurisdiction, registration requirements and disclosure standards.
International considerations reinforce urgency. The European Union’s Markets in Crypto-Assets regulation provides comprehensive frameworks for issuers and service providers. Continued U.S. regulatory ambiguity cedes leadership to jurisdictions that may not share American economic interests. More immediately, delay allows risks to accumulate as digital assets become interconnected with traditional finance through retirement plans and institutional portfolios.
Recent market failures demonstrate why regulatory clarity and investor safeguards matter. The 2022 collapse of crypto exchange FTX revealed an $8 billion dollar deficit in customer accounts, spreading losses to pension funds and individual retirement accounts. Investigators identified conflicts of interest and leverage that standard regulation would have prevented. When Silicon Valley Bank failed, one major stablecoin had 8% of reserves tied to that institution. The crisis resolved only because uninsured depositors received public support. These episodes reveal a pattern where institutions operating outside prudential supervision accumulate risks requiring public intervention.
Markets function best when rules are clear, consistently enforced and apply equally to all participants. This principle applies whether the market involves energy commodities, agricultural credit or digital assets. Louisiana’s economy depends on community banks that understand local conditions and maintain lending relationships through economic cycles. When regulatory gaps allow deposit flight to lightly supervised alternatives, these institutions lose capacity to serve small businesses and agricultural operations.
Congress has made meaningful progress on consensus-driven legislation. Completing that work would provide clarity allowing legitimate innovation while preventing regulatory arbitrage that creates systemic risk. The alternative is waiting for the next crisis to demonstrate why such frameworks were necessary.
